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Introduction 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a number of large interconnected financial 
institutions had to be bailed out because, faced with a dual liquidity and confidence crisis, they 
were struggling to sustain solvency and they were considered “too big to fail” (TBTF). The 
decision to bail out a number of major western financial institutions was taken over concerns 
about contagion in a disintegrating and highly vulnerable market, amidst a collapse of investor 
and user confidence and because most jurisdictions did not have legal and regulatory regimes 
to deal with the special requirements of bank failures outside of corporate insolvency laws.  
 
Since 2010, most Group of Twenty (G20) jurisdictions, excluding China, have introduced new 
recovery and resolution regimes to deal with bank failures (for example, the United Kingdom 
and the European Union) or have revised the scope and funding of pre-existing regimes (for 
example, the United States). Apart from the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) Key 
Attributes,1 which is a soft law document, resolution regimes worldwide have been enacted 
through legislation, namely in the European Union,2 the United Kingdom and the United 
States.3 The common objective of contemporary resolution regimes is, first, to facilitate the 
orderly failure of financial institutions in order to mitigate moral hazard and, second, to redirect 
the bulk of losses to the private sector, thereby eliminating the need for public bailouts. In 
contrast with corporate insolvency laws, which aim to maximize creditor satisfaction, the 
objectives of bank resolution regimes are to: secure operational continuity; stabilize the 
banking system by containing contagion through recapitalizing stressed institutions; and 
protect state funds by allocating losses to shareholders and debtholders, in the latter case 
through the use of debt-to-equity conversions or by writing off liabilities through the 
                                                 
1 FSB, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” (15 October 2014), online: 
<www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf>. 
2 EC, Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, [2014] OJ, L173/190 
[BRRD]. 
3 Title II of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L No 111–203, HR 
4173. 
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employment of the bail-in tool.4 Stringent creditor monitoring of bank risk is presumed to 
constrain excessive leverage5 because shareholders have strong incentives to increase leverage 
to maximize return on equity (ROE).6 The threat of a creditor bail-in should eliminate the TBTF 
subsidy7 that banks enjoy by raising the ex ante cost of bank funding. This, in principle, should 
also contain the governance costs that accompany excessive leverage in terms of pursuing 
highly risky strategies to maximize ROE8 and managerial rents.9 
 
Despite significant progress to meet resolution objectives, concerns remain as to whether the 
present arrangements will work effectively in the event of a systemic crisis. Requisite 
skepticism centres on three key issues. First, whether bailing in the creditors of a cross-border 
institution, including the conversion of pre-funded liabilities in the guise of total loss-absorbing 
capital (TLAC)10 or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL),11 
                                                 
4 Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, “A Critical Evaluation of Bail-Ins as Bank Recapitalisation 
Mechanisms” (2014) Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No 10065, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478647>. 
5 Emilios Avgouleas, “Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective” 
(2015) University of Edinburgh Working Paper. 
6 AR Admati et al, “The Leverage Ratchet Effect” (2018) 73:1 J Finance 146 (first published as AR Admati et al, 
“The Leverage Ratchet Effect” (2013) Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Working Paper 
Series No 2013/13). 
7 For an estimation of the potential impact that a creditor bail-in would have, see Frank Packer & Nikola 
Tarashev, “Rating Methodologies for Banks” (2011) BIS Q Rev 39; On the existence of the subsidy and 
calculations of its size and impact, see K Ueda & B Weder Di Mauro, “Quantifying the Value of the Subsidy for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (2011) IMF Working Paper No 12/128; R Gropp, H Hakenes & I 
Schnabel, “Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-Out Policies” (2011) 24:6 Rev Financial Studies 2084; Z 
Li, S Qu & J Zhang, “Quantifying the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees for Large Financial 
Institutions” (2011) Moody’s Analytics Quantitative Research Group White Paper, online: <www. 
moodysanalytics.com/-/media/whitepaper/2011/2011-14-01-quantifying-the-value-of-implicit-government-
guarantees-for-large-financial-institutions-20110114.pdf>; João AC Santos, “Evidence from the Bond Market 
on Banks’ ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ Subsidy’” (2014) 20:2 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy 
Review 29, online: <www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2014/EPRvol20no2.pdf>; Donald P 
Morgan & Kevin J Stiroh, “Too Big to Fail After All These Years” (2005) Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Reports No 220, online: 
<www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr220.pdf>; Zoe Tsesmelidakis & Robert 
C Merton, “The Value of Implicit Guarantees” (2012) Working Paper, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231317>. 
8 See Admati, supra note 6; AR Admati et al, “Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation” (2012) Rock Center for 
Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No 114; E Avgouleas & J Cullen, “Market 
Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive 
Boundaries” (2014) 41:1 JL& Soc’y 28. 
9 See E Avgouleas & J Cullen, “Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability 
Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship” (2014) 21:1 Colum J Eur L 1. 
10 See FSB, “Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Principles and Term Sheet” (9 November 2015), online: 
<www.fsb.org/2015/11/total-loss-absorbing-capacity-tlac-principles-and-term-sheet/>. 
11 Under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) (art 45) and derivative legislation, EU banks 
must have a minimum cushion of regulatory capital and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total 
liabilities and own funds of the institution (MREL), which is the EU way of implementing the FSB TLAC 
standard. Doubts persist, however, as to whether MREL can cure the weaknesses of the EU resolution 
framework. See E Avgouleas & C Goodhart, “An Anatomy of Bank Bail-ins: Why the Eurozone Needs a Fiscal 
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would prove sufficient to prevent the bailout of a global systemically important financial 
institution (G-SIFI). Second, there are possible undesirable consequences associated with bail-
ins when the failure is systemic rather than idiosyncratic. These issues are discussed at great 
length in our earlier publications.12 A third concern is whether there is sufficient liquidity to 
support a bank resolution. While this concern is pertinent to G-SIFI failures, the liquidity 
arrangements of domestic banks in resolution can also be unclear.  
Other aspects of the resolution debate focus on the time horizon for the valuation of failing 
banks’ losses13 and the possibility of managerial and regulatory forbearance when there are 
fears that bailing-in bank creditors in an unstable market may heighten contagion. Another 
concern is the extent to which the reformed resolution regimes are sufficient to mitigate moral 
hazard, especially in the absence of an ex post penalty regime for bank managers.14  
The last issue also relates to the question of whether current resolution regimes are premised 
on clear normative objectives. While the latter might sound more theoretical than practical, it 
is, in our view, a matter of cardinal importance. The normative values attached to any public 
policy regime are not merely expressed in its statutory objectives but also reflect and signal its 
implicit values, rationales and expected utilities. This lack of clarity and the overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting nature of resolution objectives under present frameworks are a key part 
of this chapter’s analysis.  
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections following the present introduction. The 
second section unbundles the normative objectives of contemporary resolution regimes, 
highlighting inconsistencies and shortcomings. In this context, we advocate a more relaxed 
approach to the provision of liquidity in resolution to avoid fire sales or when relying on 
depressed valuations influenced by fire sales. The third section focuses on the implications of 
draconian creditor bail-in regimes and the timing of valuations. The fourth section concludes. 
 
                                                 
Backstop for the Banking Sector” (2016) 2:2 Eur Economy 75, online: <http://european-economy.eu/2016-2/an-
anatomy-of-bank-bail-ins-why-the-eurozone-needs-a-fiscal-backstop-for-the-banking-sector/>; Tobias H 
Tröger, “Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Regime” (2018) 4:1 J Financial Reg 35. 
12 E Avgouleas & C Goodhart, “Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins” (2015) 1:1 J Financial Reg 3, online: 
<https://academic.oup.com/jfr/article/1/1/3/2357875>. 
13 Uncertainty concerning overall losses is associated with the timing and method of calculation of the value of 
bank assets with discrepancies between valuation when the bank enters resolution and at certain fixed points in 
future when the same assets might have recovered for some value. Thus, the timing of valuation is a matter of 
fundamental importance not just for the distribution of bank losses but also for observing the “no creditor worse 
off” (NCWO) principle. 
14 See Steven L Schwarcz, “Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility” (2017) 
102:2 Minn L Rev 761; Charles Nolan, Plutarchos Sakellaris & John D Tsoukalas, “Optimal Bailouts of 
Systemic Banks” (2017) Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow Working Paper. 
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Express and Implicit Objectives of Bank Resolution Regimes: The State of Confusion 
The Microprudential Dimension 
Arguably the foremost objectives of bank resolution regimes are microprudential, regardless 
of the resolution technique that authorities choose to resolve a bank. The first microprudential 
goal is securing an orderly exit through an expedited legal process involving the restructuring, 
sale or liquidation of the affected institution and/or pre-accumulated debt cushions (for 
example, contingent convertibles [CoCos], TLAC and MREL) that can be converted into 
equity to recapitalize the bank or written-off to absorb losses. The second microprudential 
objective of a bank resolution regime is the ex ante improvement of bank governance by 
augmenting risk controls and limiting leverage. This can be achieved by the close monitoring 
of creditors who want to avoid the cost of a bail-in. In addition, the risk of being bailed-in 
means that creditors ask a higher return for the money they lend to the bank raising the cost of 
bank funding enough to eliminate the TBTF subsidy.15 In contrast, inefficient bank resolution 
regimes can frustrate the impact of prudential rules that regulate capital and liquidity reserves, 
lending policies and large exposures, management quality and decision making, and systems 
and controls within going concern banks. A third microprudential objective is securing bank 
recovery16 to avoid moving the bank into disruptive resolution.  
 
The Systemic/Macroprudential Dimension 
Legal and regulatory regimes that mitigate contagion from bank failures inevitably have a 
systemic/macroprudential dimension. Peter Muelbert observes that resolution regimes have a 
macroprudential/systemic objective although they are not part of prudential regimes.17 For this 
reason, the systemic dimension of resolution regimes may be underestimated focusing instead 
on private sector participation to ameliorate moral hazard. For this reason, insufficient attention 
has been given to interconnectedness risks in resolutions and the impact of resolution actions 
on investor, creditor and depositor confidence and the subsequent reactions of these 
constituencies, which can inadvertently propagate contagion. There are two reasons for this 
shortcoming. First, bank resolution techniques are exclusively microprudential with few 
                                                 
15 For a first study of creditor reaction to a  reduction of the possibility of bailouts on creditor reaction, see 
Alexander Schäfer et al, “Bail-in expectations for European banks: Actions speak louder than words” (2016) 
European Systemic Risk Board Working Paper Series No 7.  
16 CAE Goodhart & MA Segoviano, “An approach for initiating interventions for bank recovery” (2017) 25:4 J 
Financial Ref & Compliance 360.  
17 Peter O Muelbert, “Managing Risk in the Financial System” in Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran & Jennifer 
Payne, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015) 364 at 
384.  
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exemptions due to systemic concerns.18 Second, most regimes lack clear liquidity or “funding 
in resolution” arrangements,19 although the provision of liquidity to prevent fire sales or 
valuations based on fire sales are effective stabilizing measures. Conversely, frictions in the 
supply of liquidity could result in contagion from either counterparty defaults or fire sales.20 
In this context, we regard the Bank of England’s determination to provide sufficient liquidity 
during the resolution period, subject to the Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury indemnity, as 
appropriate.21 However the United States, and more recently the European Union, have 
decided not to give central banks the power to supply resolution liquidity, opting instead for 
US Treasury and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) loans, which may be harder to 
obtain. 
 
The Moral/Normative Dimension: A Political Economy Analysis 
Resolution regimes have a number of explicit and implicit moral/normative goals that flow 
from or overlap with the aforementioned micro and macroprudential aspects of resolution 
regimes. The first is mitigating moral hazard, based on the desire to force banks to internalize 
operational costs by following the “polluter pays” principle, for example, curbing the TBTF 
subsidy and eliminating the possibility of public bailouts. The second moral/normative goal is 
to restore market discipline by restricting the funding of bailouts and other advantages 
pertaining to TBTF banks. From this flows a third moral goal, namely the Schumpeterian cycle. 
A properly calibrated resolution regime should facilitate the market exit of failing 
underperforming banks, while providing opportunities for new market entrants. The 
Schumpeterian cycle theorizes that underperformers would otherwise be sustained by public 
subsidies. Indeed, the expeditious and orderly exit of underperformers or restructuring in a 
controlled environment are important for overall economic efficiency, market competition 
characterized by a “level playing field” and the attainment of transparent capitalism. 
                                                 
18 For analysis of this point, see Steven L Schwarcz,
 
“Beyond Bankruptcy: Resolution as a Macroprudential 
Regulatory Tool” (2019) 94:2 Notre Dame L Rev 709. 
19 A shortcoming that is highlighted in the FSB reports on the implementation of the “Key Attributes.” See FSB, 
“Resilience through Resolvability — Moving from Policy Design to Implementation: Fifth Report to the G20 on 
Progress in Resolution” (18 August 2016) at 15, online: <www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Resilience-through-
resolvability—moving-from-policy-design-to-implementation.pdf>. 
20 See Emilios Avgouleas, “Fundamentals of Bank Supervision and the Lender of Last Resort in the Post-2008 
Era: A Critical Appraisal and Forward Looking Recommendations” (2016) Edinburgh School of Law Research 
Paper No 2016, online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833891>.  
21 See Bank of England, “The Bank of England’s Approach to Resolution” (October 2017) at 22, box 2, online: 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/news/2017/october/the-bank-of-england-approach-to-
resolution.pdf?la=en&hash=FC806900972DDE7246AD8CD1DF8B8C324BE7652F>. 
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The fourth apparent normative goal is the “punishment” of placid creditors. The implicit moral 
goals that flow from the microprudential and macroprudential aspects of the regime require 
interpretation, predominantly from a political economic analysis perspective. Thus, they are 
subject to dispute and none more than the apparent “punitive” nature of the regime.22 If the 
goal of the regime is, however, the containment of moral hazard, a punitive aspect may be 
inevitable for deterrence purposes. But instead of merely relying on super-rational and expert 
creditors, who can play the role of effective bank management monitors - admittedly a minority 
among bank creditors - resolution regimes should target the two constituents: bank 
management and large shareholders whose opportunistic behaviour is the key source of moral 
hazard. Furthermore, the punitive aspects of the bail-in may prove counterproductive in the 
context of resolution frameworks that should primarily focus on orderly exit. They may 
incentivize bank management to delay the resolution process for as long as possible, if their 
views can influence regulators’ decisions. In addition, the question remains as to who should 
be “punished”: the incompetent, the unlucky, the rent-seekers or the risk-takers? Shifting the 
cost of bank failures from taxpayers to bank creditors via bail-ins, often means nothing other 
than a fundamental shift of this cost from one social group to another.23 The punitive approach 
would nonetheless be better defended if it was targeting bank management and large 
shareholders, even by means of ex post penalties. 
Finally, the competitive pricing of banks’ funding to reflect true levels of bank riskiness, since 
bail-in regimes remove the shield of bailouts from senior creditors, may have some impact on 
shareholder and management appetite for risk and leverage, which seem to be symbiotic.24 
Thus, it may reinforce market discipline and make banks safer. However, it may not prove as 
effective as anticipated unless complemented by a prudential regime that is geared towards 
boosting equity buffers.  
Interest rates are critical for the level of risk assumed by banks and for attracting capital 
investment in the banks. A sustained period of very low interest rates typically leads to riskier 
lending with higher yields to keep the banks’ ROE ratios from collapsing. This predictable 
lending behaviour also leads to the accumulation of concealed risks on banks’ balance sheets. 
At the same time, a long period of ultra-low interest rates eats into banks’ profitability and 
makes bank equity a less than attractive investment. In a crisis, low interest rates and relatively 
                                                 
22 Cf Tobias H Tröger, “Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime” (2018) 4:1 J Financial Reg 35. Tröger doubts the punitive dimension of 
creditor bail-in regimes. 
23 Avgouleas & Goodhart, supra note 12. 
24 AR Admati et al, supra note 6; Avgouleas & Cullen, supra note 9. 
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high costs of equity funding may prove more critical to banks’ risk-taking behaviour and 
solvency than the TBTF subsidy.  
Taxation regimes also impact on the cost of equity in a way that influences the mix of bank 
funding, capital structure and leverage even when the TBTF subsidy is diminished.25 
Moreover, operating efficiencies, technological advantages, investment in research and 
development, client networks, economies of scale and scope also create funding advantages. 
Similarly, the level of market dominance26 is the result of a combination of factors as already 
mentioned and not just the result of the TBTF subsidy or of its absence. 
 
Bail-in’s Moral Hazard, Post-resolution Challenges and Some Remedies 
Bail-in’s Moral Hazard  
The goals of the bail-in process are different in each jurisdiction. In the United States, the 
process for a bail-in and conversion of creditor claims is embedded in the resolution regime for 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), the so-called Orderly Liquidation 
Authority (OLA).27 When a bail-in process is triggered under Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act 
the aim is to provide sufficient capital buffers for a subsidiary company to continue operations 
following the liquidation of its holding company. Nonetheless, the feasibility of the OLA 
process has not been tested during a crisis.28 
 
In the European Union, on the other hand, the “doom-loop” between bank instability and 
sovereign indebtedness has presented member state governments with a major problem. 
                                                 
25 See AR Anat et al, “Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank 
Equity Is Not Socially Expensive” (2013) Stanford Business School Working Paper 2013; AR Admati & Martin 
F Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2013). 
26A Saunders & I Walter, “Financial Architecture, Systemic Risk, and Universal Banking” (2012) 26:1 Fin 
Markets & Portfolio Mgt 39; J Hughes & L Mester, “Who Said Large Banks Don’t Experience Scale 
Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost Function” (2013) 22:4 J Financial Intermediation 559; 
DC Wheelock & PW Wilson, “Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns to Scale for U.S. 
Banks” (2013) 44:1 J Money, Credit & Banking 171; A Kovner, J Vickery & L Zhou, “Do Big Banks Have 
Lower Operating Costs?” (2014) 20:2 Federal Reserve Bank of Economic Policy Review 1 (“quantitatively, a 
10 percent increase in assets is associated with 0.3 to 0.6 percent decline in noninterest expense scaled by 
income or assets, depending on specification” at 2). For a critical review of these studies, see Emilios 
Avgouleas, “Large Systemic Banks and Fractional Reserve Banking: Intractable Dilemmas in Search of 
Effective Solutions” in Ross P Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W Arner, eds, Reconceptualising Global 
Finance and Its Regulation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 279.  
27 Supra note 3. 
28 P Kupiec & P Wallison, “Can the ‘Single Point of Entry’ Strategy be used to Recapitalize a Failing Bank?” 
(2014) American Enterprise Institute Working Paper No 8.  
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Despite the establishment of the ESM29 which could have offered a limited fiscal backstop to 
the European Banking Union (EBU), bank recapitalisation in resolution relies on bailing-in 
bank liabilities. The EU resolution regime, based on the EU BRRD and the ESM statute,30 
require bank creditors to cover the cost of a bank resolution up to eight percent of bank 
liabilities prior to any public contributions. This type of bail-in, with designated and general 
liabilities, is thought to be sufficient to cover the cost of bank failures and to sever the links 
between bank and sovereign indebtedness.  
One of the biggest challenges facing modern resolution regimes is incentivizing regulators and 
management to act ex ante when confronting problematic assets, especially non-performing 
loans (NPLs). Experience shows that when banks face high levels of NPLs, for example due 
to a preceding asset bubble (for example, Spain and Ireland) or because of adverse 
macroeconomic conditions (for example, Greece and Italy), regulators tend to act more 
expeditiously when the introduction of a fiscal backstop, normally in the form of a state-backed 
bad bank (for example, Sweden, Spain and Ireland) is being considered.31 In contrast, an 
outright bail-in of creditors could raise concerns that could delay the triggering of resolution. 
The absence of punitive, ex post bank management sanctions, as suggested by Stephen L. 
Schwarcz and analytically discussed by Charles Nolan, Plutarchos Sakellaris and John D. 
Tsoukalas,32 amounts to a major loophole. Resolution regimes, in their current form, do not 
address in full managerial incentives33 resulting in a bail-in process which could propagate 
managerial forbearance. The most important problem in this context is not that management 
might conceal NPLs, since regulatory monitoring mechanisms are quite effective; it is the 
impact on regulatory decision making that management’s unwillingness to reduce capital by 
excessively writing-off NPLs may have. 
An even bigger problem is a scenario where public authorities, fearing the systemic 
implications of a bail-in regime, opt for publicly funded solutions. An example is when, in an 
adverse macroeconomic environment, the accumulation of NPLs and other non-performing 
bank exposures (NPEs) arise from a combination of systemic (macroeconomic) and 
idiosyncratic factors. The fear that a bail-in could result in a loss of market confidence might 
force authorities to offer a reprieve to creditors of institutions where high accumulation of 
                                                 
29 Intergovernmental Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Euro-area member states (2 
February 2012) T/ESM 2012/en 2. 
30 ESM, “By-Laws”, 8 October 2012, online: <www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/esm_by-laws.pdf>.  
31 See Douglas W Arner, Emilios Avgouleas & Evan Gibson, “Overstating Moral Hazard: Lessons from Two 
Decades of Banking Crises” (2017) University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No 2017/003. 
32 Schwarcz, supra note 14; Nolan, Sakellaris & Tsoukalas, supra note 14.  
33 Ibid. 
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NPLs are mostly due to idiosyncratic factors, for example, when NPL levels in one bank are 
much higher than in other similar institutions. A good example here is the partial bailout of 
Monte dei Paschi di Sienna (MPS), which provided relief to retail creditors from a publicly 
funded “precautionary recapitalization” scheme to avoid triggering resolution under the BRRD 
(art. 32(4)(1)(d)), which would have resulted in a mandatory eight percent minimum bail-in of 
the bank’s liabilities.34 The existence of a large amount of retail bondholders, in part due to 
mis-selling,35 was a very important factor looming large in the minds of law-makers 
complicating decision-making even further, since the same bondholders also held an important 
chunk of Italian bank shares and comprised the bulk of bank depositors. Therefore, Italian 
authorities were faced with a very substantial risk of a systemic bank run for which the BRRD 
framework was affording no flexibility in the course of taking resolution (bail-in action).  
The Banca d’Italia graph,36 reproduced in Figure 1, reveals that in the years leading up to the 
2017 “early recapitalisation,” the accumulation of NPLs in MPS was twice the level of NPL 
growth in the rest of the Italian banking sector. Thus, the bailout of MPS would have been hard 
to justify without reference to the effect that a bail-in of senior creditors would have had on the 
confidence of Italian bank shareholders.37 Therefore, an inflexible bail-in process heightens 
rather than mitigates moral hazard. In fact, this is a situation that may be caused by rigid bail-
regimes regardless of the composition of the bank creditor body. For example, whereas a retail 
bondholder run was delayed until the last minute, and eventually, prevented inspite of the flaws 
of the MPS recapitalisation process,38 institutional holders of bail-inable debt would have run 
earlier and faster creating a downward spiral for all Italian banks, if it was them who held the 
bulk of Italian bank debt. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 EC, “State Aid 47677: New aid and amended restructuring plan of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena” (2017) 
4690 final, 17. 
35 See S. Micossi, “Testing the EU Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Banks: the Italian 
Experience”, LUISS SEP Policy Brief – February 15, 2019.  
36 See Carmelo Barbagallo, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Sienna (Rome, Banking and Financial Supervision 
Department of the Bank of Italy, 2017), online: <www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/interventi-vari/int-var-
2017/Barbagallo-22112017.pdf>. 
37 The subsequent performance of Italian banking stocks reinforces this view. As a relevant BIS study states: 
“Overall, the FTSE Italia All Share Banks index climbed by 10% from the beginning of June to the end of July, 
outperforming the STOXX Europe 600 Banks index, which returned nearly 5%.” See Bilyana Bogdanova & 
Mathias Drehmann, “How did markets react to bank distress in Europe?” (2017) BIS Q Rev, online: 
<www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1709u.htm>. 
38 For excellent analysis of the problems raised by the relevant investor (bondholder) compensation 
arrangements see Micossi, supra note 35 at 10-12. 
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Figure 1: Ratio between NPLs and Total Loans for MPS and the Rest of the Italian 
Banking Sector, 2007–2016 
 
Source: Barbagallo, supra note 36 at 19. 
Another good example is the winding down of the two Veneto banks in June 2017, as part of 
a wider rescue plan for the Italian banking sector. Veneto Banca (also associated with a mis-
selling scandal) and Banca Popolare di Vicenza were wound down under controversial 
circumstances. The Single Resolution Board (SRB) held that the public interest test, when 
applying the BRRD regime,39 was not satisfied.40 In particular, the SRB held that: “[N]either 
of these banks provides critical functions, and their failure is not expected to have significant 
adverse impact on financial stability.”41 Both banks were wound down by applying insolvency 
proceedings under Italian bankruptcy law. The controversial injection of government money 
was approved by the European Commission on the basis of a private sector solution — selling 
                                                 
39 BRRD, supra note 2, art 32(1), (5); EC, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single 
Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU), [2015] No 1093/2010 at art 18(1) 9c. 
40 SRB, “Decision of the Single Resolution Board concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in 
respect of Veneto Banca SpA” (2017) SRB/EES/2017/11, 11-21; SRB, “Decision of the SRB concerning the 
assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA” (2017) 
SRB/EES/2017/12 [SRB, “Decision of the SRB”]. 
41 SRB, “Decision of the SRB”, supra note 38. 
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the “good” parts of the insolvent banks to Intesa San Paolo, Italy’s largest bank.42 The senior 
bondholders of both banks were transferred to Intesa San Paolo and were not bailed in. A 
decision to wind up both banks independently of the EU resolution framework was criticized 
by the European Parliament.43 But given the inflexibility of BRRD’s eight percent requirement, 
this was necessary to prevent the collapse of the Italian banking sector. Figure 2 is indicative 
of the stabilizing effect that the Italian plan had on stock prices and bond spreads.44 
 
Figure 2: No Contagion from Bank Failures in Europe 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
 
At the same time, the NPL accumulation ratio for the two Veneto banks was substantially more 
than double that of the, see Banca d’Italia’s graph reproduced in Figure 3.45 
 
                                                 
42 EC, “State Aid 45664: Orderly liquidation of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca — Liquidation aid” 
(2017) 4501 final, 20–24.  
43 European Parliament, “The orderly liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza” (2017) 
Economic Governance Support Unit Briefing No PE 602 094, online: 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602094/IPOL_BRI(2017)602094_EN.pdf>. 
44 Bogdanova & Drehmann, supra note 37. 
45 Carmelo Barbagallo, Veneto Banca e Banca Popolare di Vicenza (Rome: Banking and Financial Supervision 
Department of the Bank of Italy, 2017) at 18, online: <www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/interventi-vari/int-var-
2017/barbagallo-audizione-02112017.pdf>. 
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Figure 3: Ratio between NPLs and Total Loans of the Veneto Banca, Popolare di 
Vicenza and the Rest of the Italian Banking Sector, 2007–2016 
 
Source: Barbagallo, supra note 45 at 18. 
 
These examples, and especially the rescue of MPS, demonstrate that draconian bail-in regimes 
can have serious undesirable consequences that can weaken rather than strengthen market 
discipline.  
Moreover, all forms of insurance raise the issue of moral hazard. The certainty that sufficient 
specially designated liabilities, such as CoCos (i.e., for a going-concern bank), TLAC and 
MREL, once resolution has been triggered, will be in place to provide adequate loss absorption 
is no exception. For example, convertible debt capital cushions proved insufficient to prevent 
the insolvency of the two Veneto banks nor did they prevent Spain’s Banco Popular from 
entering into resolution.46 Specifically, in an effort to keep the two Veneto banks solvent, 
subordinated debt capital was converted in 2015 before the injection of public funds and in 
2017 prior to the banks being wound down. Then Banco Popular’s supervisors forced the 
                                                 
46 See European Parliament, “The resolution of Banco Popular” (2017) Economic Governance Support Unit 
Briefing No PE 602.093, online: <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602093/IPOL_BRI 
(2017)602093_EN.pdf>. 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Veneto Banca Prestiti 14,663 16,793 18,190 26,425 27,058 27,700 25,519 26,142 24,670 22,997
Prestiti deteriorati 1,018 1,091 1,621 2,624 2,570 3,636 4,816 5,086 6,922 9,038
Incidenza deteriorati 6.9 6.5 8.9 9.9 9.5 13.1 18.9 19.5 28.1 39.3
Popolare di Vicenza Prestiti 23,392 23,264 25,066 28,688 30,880 31,855 32,435 30,553 28,967 27,372
Prestiti deteriorati 1,191 1,285 2,047 2,586 3,161 4,264 5,379 6,474 8,963 9,717
Incidenza deteriorati 5.1 5.5 8.2 9.0 10.2 13.4 16.6 21.2 30.9 35.5
Totale sistema bancario Prestiti 1,928,985 2,111,973 2,023,414 2,147,794 2,141,495 2,134,245 2,000,814 1,974,230 1,988,261 2,015,496
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conversion of all Common Equity Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1 (AT1), including CoCos, in 
June 2017 to prevent the bank’s collapse. This did not prevent a resolution action being 
instigated by the SRB as the bank had insufficient provisions for bad assets47 and its capital 
buffers, including the convertible component, proved to be inadequate. So, a private sector sale 
was required to keep the bank from being liquidated. This prompted a groundswell of litigation 
from junior bondholders who were either written-off (AT1) or converted (Tier 2).48 In all of 
these cases no further creditor bail-in action was taken.  
 
The Critical Matter of Asset Valuation in Resolution 
The bail-in process cannot properly function unless bank losses are identified in a finite form. 
Bank losses, including unrealized future losses, must be accurately determined to avoid 
successive rounds of bail-in losses accruing to bank creditors. This can be challenging in 
practice. For example, bank losses have been consistently underestimated, both in the Global 
Financial Crisis and subsequently in the European crisis. The valuation of assets is an inexact 
science and market cyclicality further complicates the appraisal task.49 In the uncertain 
conditions when the market is experiencing generalized asset value declines, the new 
(incoming) accountants, employed by the resolution agency, are likely to take a bad or a worst-
case scenario as their baseline for identifying losses. Previously, the accountants of the failing 
bank itself would have been encouraged (by management) to take a more positive view of the 
value of its assets. Thus, the transition from the bank’s accountants to those of the resolution 
authority is likely to cause a huge discontinuity in the form of a massive drop in published 
accounting valuations. Furthermore, there is the issue of a potential rise in the valuation of 
bank assets once the first shock has subsided. This may also be found by factoring in the 
difference between the current market value of the failing bank’s assets and their long-term 
economic value, though, admittedly, the latter is a controversial concept.  
                                                 
47 Ibid at 2. 
48 See T Hale, “Investors sue Brussels over Banco Popular sale”, FT.com (17 August 2017), online: 
<www.ft.com/content/b96003b4-8335-11e7-94e2-c5b903247afd> (“International investors have launched legal 
action against the European authorities that oversaw the failure of Banco Popular, in the latest attempt to 
overturn the decisions that led to the bank’s sale to Santander in June for €1”); F Guarascio, “Investors file 51 
lawsuits against EU for shutting Banco Popular”, Reuters.com (30 August 2017), online: 
<www.reuters.com/article/bancopopular-ma-investors/investors-file-51-lawsuits-against-eu-for-shutting-banco-
popular-idUSL8N1LF3BA> (“Disgruntled investors have filed 51 lawsuits against European Union regulators 
for shutting Spain’s Banco Popular, marking one of the largest legal challenges yet to the EU and a fresh attack 
on the bloc’s rules on bank rescues. The deluge of cases, filed with the European Union’s General Court, are the 
first legal test of how the EU applies new bank rules aimed at forcing investors to bear the costs of rescuing a 
failing lender before taxpayer money is used”).  
49 Bank failures during boom conditions (resulting from fraud, such as Barings, for example) are easier to 
handle, with less risk of contagion.  
 14 
The difference in valuations during different time periods is critical when it comes to assessing 
conformity with the NCWO principle. The reason for this is twofold. First, in an insolvency, 
creditors’ losses are judged ex post once the firm has been liquidated or sold and the assets 
have been disposed of, whereas in a resolution, bank losses are determined either when the 
bank enters into resolution or shortly thereafter. Asset prices in resolution are normally marked 
against a depressed market, and both bank sales and asset sales are bound to attract a limited 
number of buyers, which compromises the concept of competitive market prices. The 
possibility of discrepancies in valuations upon entry into resolution and ex post valuations is 
also recognized by European Banking Authority (EBA), which clarifies that the definitive 
valuation will be the ex post one where a definitive valuation upon entry to resolution is not 
possible.50 The BRRD and EBA’s technical standards recognize the ex post valuation approach 
is important when determining whether “shareholders and creditors do not receive worse 
treatment under resolution than they would have expected in a counterfactual liquidation under 
normal insolvency proceedings.”51 Martin Hellwig notes, in a recent study for the EU 
Parliament, that even this approach will not resolve the problem of attaching realistic 
calculations to an NCWO test.52  
                                                 
50 EBA, Draft Handbook on Valuation for Purposes of Resolution (2018), online: 
<https://eba.europa.eu/documents/ 
10180/2120596/2018+11+12+-+Draft+Valuation+Handbook+-+clean.pdf/918db9fa-c951-494f-b51b-
af2e119797b5 (“To enable the [Resolution Authority] to take action also in circumstances of urgency...the 
BRRD envisages the possibility for resolution action to be adopted also on the basis of a provisional valuation 
(Art. 36(2) and (9))....Such valuation consists of two steps: the first requiring the subdivision of creditors into 
classes, the second establishing an estimate of the treatment that such classes would receive should the 
institution be put in insolvency...An ex‐post definitive valuation is envisaged when the resolution decision has 
been informed on the basis of a provisional valuation (Article 36 (10) BRRD). The provisional and the ex‐post 
definitive valuation...may yield different results, having regard to the higher granularity of the available 
information, the valuation approach adopted and the time available....The ex‐post definitive valuation may rely 
on data and information not available to the valuer or the RA when performing the provisional valuation...In 
accordance with Article 6(e) of that Regulation, the valuation report should explain the differences between the 
methodologies and assumptions used in the provisional and in the ex‐post definitive valuation” at 14–15).  
51 The EBA Regulatory Technical Standards on valuations in resolution note: “[T]he assumptions governing the 
estimation of the treatment that shareholders or creditors would have received in insolvency are driven by the 
sole purpose of determining the appropriate discounted value of cash flows that could reasonably be expected 
under the relevant national insolvency procedures.” EBA, “RTS on Valuation in Resolution, Final Draft: 
Regulatory Technical Standards on Valuation for the purposes of resolution and on valuation to determine 
difference in treatment following resolution under Directive 2014/59/EU on recovery and resolution of credit 
institutions and investment firms,” EBA/RTS/2017/05, EBA/RTS/2017/06 at 6, online: 
<https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1853532/Final+draft+RTSs+on+valuation+in+resolution+%28EBA-
RTS-2017-05+%26+EBA-RTS-2017-06%29.pdf>. 
52 Martin F Hellwig, “Valuation reports in the context of banking resolution: What are the challenges? Banking 
Union Scrutiny” (2018) EP In-depth Analysis PE624.417, online: 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/624417/IPOL_IDA(2018) 
624417_EN.pdf> (“First, in a resolution procedure, one may never learn what investors’ payouts in a 
counterfactual insolvency procedure would have been. Indeed, the very resolution decision that is taken may 
preclude the attainment of such information by anybody. For example, when the sale-of-business tool is used, 
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Beyond the application of the NCWO principle, there are other often neglected systemic 
implications attached to valuation in resolution. A pessimistic valuation will result in much 
deeper write-downs, write-offs or conversion haircuts, with the ensuing creditor losses being 
greater than previously anticipated based on the valuation assumptions of the pre-resolution 
auditors. This could lead investors to question the valuations of other banks, leading to a rapid 
deterioration in confidence and a contagious crisis.  
One solution is to freeze payouts53 given that an additional backstop is provided by deposit 
insurance. A temporary moratorium of payments on asset disposals would require a robust 
liquidity support mechanism to avoid severe side effects. These side effects include 
consequential defaults, for example large corporations needing access to deposits, a panic or 
even a bank run.54 With the BRRD and the SRM Regulation silent on resolution funding, the 
European Council recently gave the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) the power to borrow from 
the ESM (from 2024) to fund resolution actions.55 This arrangement follows the Dodd-Frank 
Act resolution funding arrangements where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation can 
obtain resolution funding by borrowing from the US Treasury. Whether this decision offers an 
effective solution to the problem of “funding resolution” is doubtful given the limited size of 
the fund and the conditions to mitigate moral hazard imposed by the ESM.56  
Either way, subjectivity and arbitrariness when measuring risk and the illiquidity of non-
tradable assets will remain, especially when assessing conditional probability distributions of 
future returns based on unreliable data. Markets may rebound following a downturn to provide 
reliable mark-to-market data, but in the absence of an arbitrary cut-off date, forbearance is no 
panacea. 
                                                 
the bank and its assets are likely to be integrated into the purchaser’s business so that no additional information 
about the assets, let alone the proceeds of a potential liquidation is generated” at 13–14).   
53 A temporary freeze on payments is discussed in the Bank of England’s approach to resolution.  
54 Hellwig, supra note 52 at 15. 
55 The heads of state and government of the 19 Euro-area countries endorsed a package of proposals on 
deepening the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at the Euro Summit on 14 December 2018. Proposals 
included the introduction of the common backstop for the SRF provided by the ESM.  
56 The size of the credit line will be aligned with the SRF funds, which by 2024 will be around €60 billion, or 
one percent of covered deposits in the Banking Union. If the credit line is used, the SRF will pay back the ESM 
loan with money from bank contributions within three years, although this period can be extended up to another 
two years. Disbursements under the common backstop will be approved by the ESM board of directors, 
consisting of high-level officials from the 19 Euro-area finance ministries, by mutual agreement. Procedures 
will be in place so that such approval can be made swiftly and efficiently (in as little as 12 hours) in strict 
confidentiality because of the sensitive nature of the data. The council realized that the funding was inadequate, 
and the issue of “liquidity provision in resolution” will be discussed further in 2019.  
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Liquidity Support in Resolution 
The EU approach to bail-ins increases the significance of liquidity support. The European 
Council decision to allow the ESM to lend money to the SRF to fund resolutions is important 
in acknowledging the existence of the problem. It is also a positive step that ESM provision of 
liquidity to the SRF will not be subject to ESM conditionality like sovereign funding. However, 
this facility will be limited by the size of the SRF reserves. We suggest that further liquidity 
could be provided by the ECB either to each legal entity, against the entity’s collateral available 
to that entity, or channelled through a parent company. Typically, a G-SIFI is funded mostly 
through retail and other short-term deposits, which, in the event of a bail-in, could either dry 
up or even be withdrawn. Thus, a G-SIFI in resolution may require considerable official 
liquidity support. This should only be provided on a fully collateralized basis, with appropriate 
haircuts applied to the collateral, to reduce the risk of loss, but this depends on the adequacy 
of available collateral. 
Lender of last resort (LoLR) liquidity is provided alongside other measures to stabilize a failing 
bank. These financial stability measures may not prevent the bank from entering resolution. 
The United Kingdom has a liquidity framework that allows HM Treasury to indemnify the 
central bank (Bank of England) when a loss is incurred from funding a bank in resolution (for 
example, a bridge bank).57 If a central bank provides liquidity to fund a resolution, this may 
not qualify as LoLR finance but rather as state aid, which could require high-grade collateral. 
By this stage of the resolution process, some bank assets will be impaired, and the scope of 
central bank liquidity provided to a bank entering resolution would be uncertain, especially in 
the absence of a state indemnity facility.  
The BRRD provides that resolution is primarily financed by national resolution funds that can 
also borrow from each other.58 The Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS)59 will have to contribute 
for the purpose of ensuring continuous access to covered deposits and the requisite 
contributions will be in cash for an amount equivalent to the losses that the DGS would have 
had to bear in normal insolvency proceedings. Namely, the DGS contribution is made in cash 
in order to absorb the losses incurred from the covered deposits.60 The DGS is solely liable for 
                                                 
57 See HM Treasury, “Banking Act 2009: Special Resolution Regime code of practice” (12 March 2015), online: 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/banking-act-2009-revised-special-resolution-regime-code-of-practice>; 
EC, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing 
arrangements [2015] OJ, L 11/44. 
58 BRRD, supra note 2, art 99ff. 
59 BRRD, supra note 2, arts 45(6), 108(b), 109, recs 71, 110, 111. 
60 BRRD, supra note 2, art 109(3). 
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the protection afforded to covered depositors.61 If following a contribution by the DGS, the 
institution under resolution fails at a later stage, and the DGS does not have sufficient funds to 
repay depositors, the DGS must have arrangements in place in order to raise the corresponding 
amounts expeditiously from its members. Otherwise, treating the DGS as an unsecured creditor 
in the event of a systemic crisis might raise doubts concerning the availability of sufficient 
funds. 
At this stage of the resolution process, robust LOLR liquidity support would mitigate the risk 
of a fire sale and therefore it would contain systemic risk spillovers. Depressed market prices 
due to fire sales have an adverse effect on the value of the wider banking sector, especially in 
an environment where bank balance sheets are rather homogeneous. In our view, the UK’s 
arrangements should also be followed in the EBU with an ESM backstop, in the form of a long-
term indemnity, offered to the ECB to provide liquidity in resolution, whenever other 
arrangements for down-streaming liquidity come short.  
 
Post bail-in bank funding 
Market confidence in the bailed-in institution would have to be quickly restored in order to 
preserve franchise value and reimburse official liquidity support.62 This is mostly dependent 
on how fast the bank’s capital structure will be rebuilt or the establishment of a strongly 
capitalized new bank in the event of a “closed” bank process. If an institution has entered into 
a death spiral and becomes subject to a run with customers, creditors and depositors all fast 
disappearing, reversing this trend would doubtless prove a daunting task.  
Under the BRRD’s open bank procedure, reliance on the creditor bail-in process to recapitalize 
banks can result in several funding rounds including post-resolution rounds. For example, a 
bail-in involving the Portuguese Novo Banco bank resulted in the creation of a “good bank” 
from the resolution of the failed Espirito Santo bank.63 Nonetheless successive bail-in rounds 
can alarm investors when market funding is needed to resolve a bank, or its successors, to full 
financial health.  
Policy makers tend to underestimate the dynamics of a bank run ex post, even where creditors 
face no potential losses in the aftermath of a resolution action. This is due, presumably, to 
                                                 
61 BRRD, supra note 2, art 109(1). 
62 See Joseph H Sommer, “Why Bail-In? And How!” (2014) 20:2 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Econ Pol 
Rev 207.  
63 For example, senior creditors of Novo Banco had to suffer further bail-in rounds despite the steep haircut 
applied to junior creditors who absorbed the losses of the bad bank. See M Arnold & Thomas Hale, “ECB under 
fire as Portugal hits Novo Banco bondholders”, FT.com (7 Jan 2016); Christopher Whittall, “Investors File Suit 
Against Bank of Portugal Over Novo Banco”, WSJ.com (5 April 2016).  
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reputation risks and the (possibly irrational) fear of future financial difficulties.64 The dynamic 
is much greater when banks and creditors have experienced large losses from the triggering of, 
and subsequent, bail-in rounds.65  
Resolution regimes that aim to restore systemic stability to serve their macroprudential 
objectives should also address the question of what happens when a bank exits the resolution 
stage, post-bail-in, and is returned to the regulator’s custody, but market funding for it remains 
scarce.66 While the aim of the bail-in is that the bank itself (in the EU framework) or its 
successor exit resolution as a going concern,67 the possibility that the bank might face market 
reluctance to fund it, for example, due to reputation shocks and funders’ behavioural 
constraints,68 should not be discounted.  
There are two possible approaches to post-resolution funding. The first would use the central 
bank to provide liquidity support as the LoLR. Arguably, liquidity support in this case could 
lead to avoidance of future bail-in rounds69 and thus act as a solvency prop. In addition, LoLR 
funding at this early stage would come with a certain stigma attached. The second is funding 
the post-resolution bank through a pre-committed collateralised facility.  
In the opinion of the first author this could be done through fully collateralised bonds issued 
post-resolution to institutional investors that have committed to funding the facility ex ante.70 
Such a facility has the dual advantage of preventing any post-resolution creditor runs while 
substantially resolving the bank funding needs. The costs of such a funding scheme would 
depend on how successful the preceding resolution has been augmenting the incentives of the 
resolution authority and other relevant parties to handle resolutions with due concern to ex post 
market reactions. The second approach is also a fiscally neutral position, even though in the 
case of the EBU the ESM could be used as a guarantor of the first tranche of such bonds, which, 
however, would inevitably result in over-collateralisation.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a systematic analysis of the reformed bank resolution regimes 
                                                 
64 See Mark Carlson & Jonathan Rose, “Can a Bank Run Be Stopped? Government Guarantees and the Run on 
Continental Illinois” (2016) BIS Working Papers No 554, online: <www.bis.org/publ/work554.pdf>.  
65 Arnold & Hale, supra note 63; Christopher Whittall, supra note 63.  
66 For a wider discussion, see Avgouleas, supra note 20. 
67 BRRD, supra note 2, art 43(2)(a). 
68 For insightful analysis of this problem, see Carlson & Rose, supra note 64. 
69 Avgouleas, supra note 20. 
70 This idea matured in the context of some intensive email exchanges between the first author and senior ESM 
director and esteemed colleague Mike Hesketh in the weeks preceding Mike’s sudden death (+2 May 2019) and 
pays tribute to Mike’s preliminary work on post-resolution bank funding.  
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implemented during the post-global financial crisis period. In this context, the chapter has 
considered the key objectives underpinning the new resolution regimes. Despite the progress 
made in key jurisdictions (for example, the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
European Union) the chapter has identified persistent problems with the application of 
contemporary resolution frameworks especially in the European Union. It has also highlighted 
the confusing nature of the explicit and implicit objectives pursued by reformed resolution 
regimes. Relevant analysis has particularly focused on the shortcomings of bail-in regimes in 
the pursuit of macroprudential objectives and the mitigation of moral hazard. Funding in 
resolution requires a more liberal liquidity regime to provide the desired stabilizing effect. 
However, resolution regimes per se cannot stabilize the banking system. Tax regime reforms, 
ex post penalties for bank management, increasing the liability of key shareholders and 
measuring more accurately the impact of very low interest rates on bank balance sheets are all 
equally important elements that need to be considered to ameliorate the TBTF effect and 
strengthen financial stability. 
  
